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Two  decades  of substantial  economic  growth  in  Africa  have  challenged  the  deep-seated  Afro-pessimism
of  the 1990s  and  2000s  and  re-invigorated  the  academic  debate  on  Africa’s  ability  to grow  out  of poverty
in  the  21st century.  Although  the  opinions  differ  widely  on how  sustainable  current  African  growth  tra-
jectories  are,  there  is  a widespread  consensus  that  a  fundamental  agricultural  transformation  is key  to
consolidate  current  and  future  welfare  gains.  This  study  interprets  recent  signs  of agricultural  productivity
growth  from  a long  term  global  historical  context,  arguing  that  the  combination  of  present-day  devel-
opments  in information  and communication  technology,  transport  infrastructure,  demographic  growth,
urbanization  and  in  macro-economic  governance  form  a fundamental  break  with  African  history.  This
break  does  not  offer  any  guarantees,  but it does  raise  the  probability  that  Africa  will  complete  a  green
revolution  of  its own.
©  2014  Royal  Netherlands  Society  for Agricultural  Sciences.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights
reserved.. Introduction
After several centuries of rising global inequality during the so-
alled era of the Great Divergence,  our generation is witnessing a
ew epoch in world history, one of rapid economic convergence.1
merging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey are
econﬁguring the gravity centers of the global economy with aston-
shing speed. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region torn apart by
ecades of civil war and economic crises, hopeful signs of grow-
ng prosperity have emerged in recent years [1–3]. It remains to
e seen, however, to which extent Africa’s current growth revival
uilds on a profound transformation of the social, political and
conomic fabric. Is the region not just experiencing the inevitable
ecovery from an equally inevitable post-colonial collapse? And
hat sets this wave of growth apart from recurring African cycles of
atural resource booms and busts, driven by volatile world market
rices for tropical cash crops and mineral resources?The historical analogy that shores up the argument I will develop
n this study is that no civilization in the past has ﬂourished for long,
ithout an effective strategy to gather, produce or trade food in
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 317484027.
E-mail address: ewout.frankema@wur.nl
1 This study is a revised version of the inaugural lecture I gave upon taking up the
ost of professor of Rural and Environmental History at Wageningen University on
3  May  2013. I am grateful to Katherine Frederick and Sanne Mirck for student assis-
ance and text-editing and to the anonymous reviewers of this paper. All remaining
rrors are mine.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
573-5214/© 2014 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsesufﬁcient quantity and quality. Food surpluses were needed to raise
armies, build cities and ﬁll treasuries. In his monumental Agrarian
History of Western-Europe Slicher van Bath - the ﬁrst chair of Rural
History in Wageningen and founding father of the ‘New Economic
History’ in the Netherlands – has demonstrated that the afﬂuence
we enjoy at present, is rooted in millennia of agrarian change [4]. In
a similar vein, Bieleman’s analysis of Five Centuries of Dutch Farming
shows in detail how the rise of the Dutch urban economy in early
modern times was rooted in a fertile exchange between city and
countryside [5].
The analogy does not stop here though. Although the Asian
renaissance of the late 20th century has primarily been associated
with rapid industrialization, it has been preceded by impres-
sive gains in agricultural output and productivity [6–9]. In the
Philippines, where the famous International Rice Research Insti-
tute (IRRI) was established in 1960, rice yields doubled in no time.
In Indonesia, the Suharto regime accomplished what the Dutch had
failed to do before, namely, to turn the country from a net importer
of rice into a net exporter in just one decade after the food crisis
of the early 1970s [10]. And India, one of the most famine-prone
regions of the world for centuries, managed to avert the Malthu-
sian doom scenarios painted by many a respected scientist in the
late 1960s [11,12]. In Latin America productivity increases were
impressive as well. In Mexico wheat yields started to rise at expo-
nential rates in the 1950s. In Brazil maize output per hectare has
quadrupled since the early 1960s (see Fig. 1).
The timing of the ‘Green Revolution’ could hardly have been bet-
ter. It occurred exactly in the period when world population growth
vier B.V. All rights reserved.
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that most of the productivity gains in American agriculture dur-ig. 1. The per capita production of food in Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan
frica, 1961-2011 Source: FOASTAT [14].
eached its peak. Except for Sub-Saharan Africa.2 In Africa, food
roduction did not keep pace with population growth. Certainly,
gricultural production rose in absolute terms, but mainly because
rowing numbers of smallholders brought more land under cul-
ivation [13]. In the majority of African countries the per capita
roduction of food declined from the 1960s through the 1990s.
ccording to FAO statistics, even today some 30 out of 53 African
ountries produce less food per head of the population than they
id in the early 1960s [14]. Whereas historically food shortages had
een of an incidental nature, caused by climate shocks, disease epi-
emics or military conﬂict, in the late 20th century they became the
esult of a structural mismatch between local demand and supply
15]. Large-scale famines, a typically Asian phenomenon until the
960s, became increasingly associated with Africa [16,17].
The recent catastrophe in the Horn of Africa has revived the
mages of the horrible famine of the mid-1980s. If anything, it indi-
ates that amidst the present optimism, African growth experiences
emain highly differentiated. That structural food shortages have
ot led to a much higher incidence of famine owes much to mod-
rn means of transportation and communication, facilitating large
cale food imports as well as improving the effectiveness of inter-
ational food aid programs. In Ethiopia in the 1980s, as well as
ecently in Somalia, attempts to alleviate drought-induced harvest
ailures were frustrated by dirty wars, causing hundreds of thou-
ands of excess deaths. More effective interventions of food aid
voided such dire consequences in countries like Niger and Malawi,
hich were also coping with serious food crises in the past decade
18].
According to the UN, the world population will grow from
oughly 7 billion at present to 10 billion at the end of this century.
bout 70% of the projected increase, that is 2.3 billion, is expected
o occur in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (see Fig. 2). Yet, the challenge
oes even beyond the need to improve food security in times of
apidly increasing demand. The challenge also involves the need
o balance the growth of urban sectors with rising rural incomes
19]. Since the majority of Africans is still employed in agricul-
ure, improving rural living standards is the key to mitigate further
ncreases in socio-economic inequality, the key to raising domes-
ic consumer demand and, eventually, the key to strengthening the
scal basis of African societies.
Fortunately, there is a renewed focus of national and interna-
ional agencies on rural development in Africa. The World Bank,
fter a period of neglect during the structural adjustment pro-
rams of the 1980s and 1990s [20,21], now increasingly recognizes
2 I will also use the shorter term ‘Africa’ as a substitute for ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’
ereafter.Fig. 2. Observed and expected population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-2100
(billions of people) Source: United Nations, World Population Database [23].
Africa’s economic, geographic and institutional diversity.3 In addi-
tion, there is an outspoken ambition to avoid the environmental
costs of the original green revolution in terms of water and soil
pollution, land erosion and loss of biodiversity. Indeed, the call for
a ‘doubly green revolution’ stresses the need to combine agricul-
tural productivity growth with more sustainable forms of natural
resource management [22].
But while embarking on renewed investment and research
efforts, it is worthwhile to take the long-term picture into account.
After all, why did Africa miss the green revolution in the ﬁrst place?
And what reasons do we have to think that this time is different? In
the remainder of this study I argue that a global historical perspec-
tive offers some insights that deserve to be heard in the present
debate on Africa’s growth revival.
2. The Green Revolution
‘Timing’ is a crucial aspect of revolutions. To understand what
the green revolution exactly entailed, we  need to understand why
it occurred when it did. The standard tale portrays the green revo-
lution as a technological breakthrough in the development of new
high-yielding varieties of cereal grains, especially wheat, rice and
maize, between the early 1940s and the late 1970s [24]. Experi-
ments with these new varieties started in Mexico in 1943 by the
team of Norman Borlaug, an American agronomist who won  the
Nobel peace prize in 1970 for his path-breaking research. These
new varieties were designed to transform increasing inputs of
water and artiﬁcial fertilizer into a larger number of kernels per
ear. Heavier ears were made to grow on shorter and stronger stems
in order to prevent the plants from lodging. The cultivation of new
varieties was complemented by an intensiﬁed use of machinery,
irrigation, and a wide range of insecticides, pesticides and herbi-
cides.
It is important to recognize, however, that most of the ‘techno-
logical’ ingredients of the green revolution had been in the delivery
room of history for quite some time. The increased use of fertil-
izer had been part and parcel of expanding global trade in the
19th century, when large quantities of Peruvian guano and Chilean
nitrates were shipped across the Atlantic and the Paciﬁc to fertilize
European and North American acres [25]. The economic historians
Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode [26] have made a compelling caseing the 19th century stemmed from biological innovations in plant
and animal disease control, including the experimentation with,
3 The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a joint initiative of the
Rockefeller and the Gates Foundations, also speciﬁcally aims to promote tailor-made
projects.
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Fig. 3. Tsetse infested parts of Sub-Saharan Africa Source: Alsan [31]..E. Frankema / NJAS - Wageningen Jo
nd application of, cross-breeding techniques. In other words, the
green revolution’ was already gaining steam in the industrializing
ountries in the 19th century. Therefore, the real revolution was not
o much about technological innovation, but much more about the
apid diffusion of useful scientiﬁc knowledge across large parts of
he Southern hemisphere.
If we pursue this argument, the question of timing redirects
ttention to the role of state policy in overcoming certain market
mperfections. Asian governments channelled substantial public
esources into the development of rural infrastructure and credit
acilities. They subsidized and coordinated technical support to
armers. They offered infant-industry protection to emerging fer-
ilizer industries and, in some cases, Asian governments went as far
s to distribute micro-packages of hybridized seed and fertilizer to
ncourage farmers to grow new cultivars [27].
The political momentum that pushed Asian governments into
uch a pro-active role had been building up during the Cold War.
he Americans, in particular, feared that the impoverished masses
n Asia would act as a magnet to socialist propaganda. The term
Green Revolution” was introduced to contrast America’s foreign
olicy with the violence associated with Red guerilla movements.4
Green”, as opposed to “Red”, was the color of peace. Peaceful scien-
iﬁc progress was presented as the capitalist alternative to combat
unger, poverty and inequality [28]. Leaders like Marcos, Suharto
nd Indira Ghandi came to see ‘rice, roads and schools’ as crucial
omponents of their attempt to centralize power and raise popular
upport [10].
So when it comes to explaining agrarian transitions, there are
everal perspectives one may  take, varying from a strictly tech-
ological approach that emphasizes the speciﬁc opportunities and
onstraints of local ecologies, to a political economy approach that
ocuses on the incentive structures underlying speciﬁc forms of
uman cooperation, or lack thereof. These perspectives are not
utually exclusive, on the contrary. In African history they are
eeply intertwined.
. Africa’s legacy of extensive agriculture
Modern genetic research suggests that our common ancestors
riginated in Africa and that they reached anatomical modernity
ome 200,000 years ago [29]. However, although the homo sapiens
ad been around in Africa for perhaps twice as long as in the rest
f the world, the ﬁrst urban civilizations supported by sedentary
griculture emerged outside Africa. In fact, Africa has remained one
f the least densely populated areas of the world until today, and it
s only in the second half of the 20th century that it was  home to one
f the biggest population booms ever recorded in human history.
lthough the debate on the demographic impact of the African slave
rades is still unsettled [30], few scholars would dispute that Africa
ffered a comparatively inhospitable environment for sustaining
arge concentrations of people. Apart from the high incidence of
ropical diseases such as malaria, there were a number of barriers
o the development of sedentary agriculture.
To begin with, Africa is not very well endowed with navigable
aterways. Anyone who has some afﬁnity with Dutch economic
istory will recognize what this implies for the opportunities of
ommercial development. When excluding the Sahara and Kala-
ari deserts, where supporting large concentrations of people is
mpossible anyway, the lion’s share of Africa’s cultivable land lies
n the tropics. Rain forests host a broad range of edible crops, but
ood cannot be stored for long in warm and moist climates. The pos-
ibilities for the reﬁnement, processing and trading of food items
4 USAID director William Gaud is credited with the invention of this term in 1968
28].were therefore more limited than in temperate climates. Tropical
soils are fertile, but also quickly exhausted, favouring systems of
extensive land use and day-to-day harvests of roots, tubers and
starchy fruit, such as plantain, for immediate consumption, along
with the production of cereal grains.
Livestock breeding broadens the opportunities to store wealth,
mediate risks and raise land productivity in pre-industrial soci-
eties. However, the presence of the tsetse ﬂy in the African tropical
forest belt has rendered large tracts of cultivable land unsuitable
to the development of mixed farming systems [31,32]. The tsetse
ﬂy is the principle biological vector of African trypanosomiasis,
better known as sleeping sickness (see Fig. 3). Apart from threat-
ening human lives, it kills cattle and horses. Tsetse has hampered
the intensiﬁcation and commercialisation of African agriculture in
several ways. It impeded the development of ox-plough cultiva-
tion, it reduced the animal manure available for soil regeneration,
it limited sources of animal protein, and it impeded the use of
cattle and horses for transportation purposes. Hence, whereas in
Eurasia a considerable part of the energy required for soil prepara-
tion and transportation was  supplied by animals, in tropical Africa
the energy had to be supplied by scarce human labour. The hoe
thus remained the principle tool for soil preparation and human
porterage the principle method for moving goods over large dis-
tances.
Large parts of the African savannah outside the tsetse-infested
forest zone cope with prolonged periods of drought. The highly
erratic rainfall patterns caused by the Asian-Australian monsoon
system, turn the cultivation decisions of many East African farmers
into a repeated gamble [33]. Interestingly, there is archaeologi-
cal evidence of various pockets of intensive agriculture in East
Africa, none of which have withstood the test of time. Historians are
unsure about the causes of their disappearance, but it seems likely
that climate shocks have played an important role [34]. In the most
arid parts of the West African Sahel and East African coastal regions,
nomadic pastoralism has proven to be the only way to sustain a
living.
A map  of current population densities reveals how environmen-
tal conditions have shaped human settlement patterns in African
history. Large concentrations of people can be found along the river
Nile in Egypt and the Niger river system in present-day Nigeria.
Other spots of high concentration can be found in the African rift
valley, stretching from Ethiopia in the North all the way South
into the Shire highlands of present-day Malawi. This area con-
tains fertile land at higher altitudes where tsetse ﬂies and malaria
mosquitos fail to thrive.
2 urnal of Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 17–24
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. Environmental determinism?
We  may  safely conclude that the widespread practice of exten-
ive agriculture did not create optimal conditions for the type
f intensiﬁcation that characterised the green revolution in Asia.
owever, before reading a strong version of environmental deter-
inism into African history, I would like to put forward three
rguments against over-simplifying conclusions.
First, we should not dismiss African agriculture as a ‘primi-
ive’ undertaking. Shifting cultivation was a logical response to
ong regeneration periods of tropical soils that were poorly under-
tood by European colonizers, who often regarded this waste of
and as a sign of laziness or African irrationality. If we  dig deeper
nto the historical record of African agriculture, the terms ‘adap-
ive’ or ‘responsive’ offer a much more adequate conception of its
ong-term evolution. After all, maize and cassava, the two  biggest
taple crops of Sub-Saharan Africa, did not originate in the region,
ut were adopted from the New World [35,36]. The same goes
or potatoes, beans, peanuts and a large range of cash-crops such
s tobacco, cocoa, cotton, and rubber [37]. In fact, there is little
istorical ground for the idea that African farmers fail to see the
otential of new crops or new crop varieties. There is a much bet-
er case to make that seemingly conservative cultivation decisions
re guided by deep-seated strategies of risk-minimization, rather
han income-maximization [38].
Second, we should not conclude without further empirical
nvestigation, that extensive agriculture left the average African
ubsistence farmer worse off than his counterparts elsewhere in
he world.5 Recent research into historical African living standards
uggests that during the colonial era nutritional conditions have
een considerably better in West Africa than they were in East-
rn and Southern Asia. And there are reasons to believe that this
lso holds for earlier periods. Yes, there existed competition over
carce water resources and high-value land, which also played out
n violent confrontations, but such conﬂicts were fought out in the
ontext of an open land frontier where Malthusian pressures were
argely absent.
The distinguished British historian Tony Hopkins recently noted
hat according to dependency theorists life in the African colonies
as “nasty, British and short”.6 A new generation of historians is
rying to break out of the ideological chains of neo-Marxist history,
nd the Eurocentric explanations of African history it has forged,
y simply acknowledging that the experiences of the Kuba in the
ongo Free State during the rubber terror in the 1890s contrasted
harply with those of the Asante cocoa farmers in the Gold Coast
uring the 1920s [45–47]. Research of Alexander Moradi and others
oints out that, if anything, average human stature rose during the
olonial era [48–50]. In several studies conducted together with
arlous van Waijenburg we document a rise in urban real wages
tarting in the 1880s and continuing until the late 1960s [41,51].
hese welfare gains were more impressive in some places than in
thers and much research remains to be done in documenting and
xplaining these varying trajectories of welfare development (see
ig. 4).
However, in anticipation of a better empirical foundation I
emain sympathetic to John Iliffe’s qualiﬁcation of historical African
overty as “land-rich poverty” [15]. African poverty was rooted
n a high exposure to tropical diseases and pre-mature death, but
hose who survived had access to a comparatively rich nutritional
5 See for expressions of what may  be called “the persistent poverty view” Bloom
nd  Sachs [39] or Allen [40]. See for a critique Frankema and Waijenburg [41].
6 Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa [42] is the classic study, but
uch of what has been written between the 1970s and 2000s contains traces of
ependency theory. See also Gareth Austin’s critique [43] of Acemoglu et al. [44].Fig. 4. Real wages of urban unskilled workers in Calcutta, New Delhi and Accra,
1870-2000 (1 = subsistence level) Source: Frankema and van Waijenburg [41,51].
environment. African cattle herders, who had access to animal pro-
tein and dairy in exceptional quantities, were exceptionally tall
for pre-industrial standards [49]. Yet, the rinderpest epidemic that
swept across East and Southern Africa in the 1890s killed approx-
imately 90% of all cattle. Pastoral groups such as the Masai in
Kenya, who were generally regarded as a healthy and wealthy tribe,
starved to death in large numbers along with their animals [52].
But the most important argument against environmental deter-
minism is the enormous potential of industrial technology and
mechanical power that has become available in the past two
centuries. Railways have cut back transportation costs. Artiﬁcial
fertilizers can compensate for a lack of animal manure, tractors
for a lack of animal draft power. There has also become available
a broad range of new crop varieties that are speciﬁcally tailored
to local African ecologies. Examples of technological innovation
and knowledge improvements can be discussed at length, but the
argument can also be framed into a more fundamental question: if
the advances in modern medical technology and knowledge have
allowed the African population to quadruple since 1950, why then
would similar gains be inconceivable in African agriculture?
5. African state formation in retrospective
Some studies suggest that the 11% food shortfall in Niger in 2005
could have been prevented by a simple program of distributing
micro-doses of fertilizer to farmers and that such a program, even
apart from the long-term knowledge spill-overs, would have cost
only a quarter of the actual incurred emergency aid expenses [18].
If we  accept that states have played a critical role in the spread
of the green revolution in Asia, namely by addressing a number of
market failures in the supply of rural infrastructure, credit facilities,
education and access to intermediate inputs, we should also pay
some attention to the historical features of African state formation.
Early independent African states were ﬁscally underdeveloped,
their bureaucracies were understaffed and undereducated, and
there was a widespread incapacity to support economic policy-
making with reliable statistical information [53–55]. State policies
designed to serve ‘national interests’ were paralyzed by a mosaic of
ethnic, religious and tribal identities. If early independent African
states were able to secure a monopoly on the use of violence in the
ﬁrst place, it tended to be an unstable monopoly at best. Obafemi
Awolowo, one of the founding fathers of independent Nigeria, has
put it as follows: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical
expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are
‘English’, ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’.” [56].
It has become a commonplace to argue that the creation of
‘states without nations’ was  among the worst long-term legacies
of European colonial rule in Africa, and I fully subscribe to this
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oint. Few people realize, however, that the effective broadcast-
ng of power by colonial governments was complicated by similar
onditions that had hampered state centralisation in pre-colonial
imes. The crux of the problem was how to integrate relatively
solated and mobile groups of people, scattered across vast rural
interlands, into the structures of a central state administration?
n a context of shifting cultivation and nomadic pastoralism it is
irtually impossible, and prohibitively expensive, to impose taxes
n land or agricultural output. African state development was  thus
ound to the extraction of rents from trade and human captives.
et, for the maintenance of courts, bureaucracies and armies, these
re comparatively instable sources of revenue. Moreover, the prac-
ice of slave raiding to generate revenue created a highly adverse
ynamic of violence, fugitive conduct and counter-insurgencies
57].
Since control over people, rather than land, was  key to achiev-
ng political ambitions, there were little incentives to formalize
nstitutions for land tenure. The imposition of the European state
oncept in Africa, in which delineated territorial borders were a
entral part of the political logic, thus caused a rupture in the his-
orical evolution of the African state [58]. Yet, colonial borders were
rimarily designed to prevent intra-European conﬂicts on African
oil, without having to overstretch limited government resources to
ctually control these territories. Frederick Cooper aptly depicted
hese colonial constructs as ‘gatekeeper states’ [59].
Colonial arrangements with respect to land tenure differed
idely. In the settler colonies of Southern and Eastern Africa, land
as alienated at a considerable scale to facilitate the settlement of
uropean farmers. In Central Africa large tracts of land were given
n concession to private companies and missionaries. In parts of
est Africa, however, European land ownership was  discouraged
r even prohibited [60]. Although the colonial state managed to
xtract some revenue from land grants, it primarily relied on a com-
ination of trade, hut and head taxes [61,62]. These tax revenues
ere re-invested in the exploitation of mines and the facilitation of
ash-crop exports. The improvement of subsistence agriculture was
iven no priority, and in some cases also suffered from the labour
hat was withdrawn from it to spur the more proﬁtable sectors
f the colonial economy. Yet, in many landlocked regions colo-
ial tax revenues remained insufﬁcient to ﬁnance even the lightest
keleton of a state administration. To accommodate this problem,
he French created large federations in West and Equatorial Africa
o redistribute revenues from the richer coastal colonies such as
abon, Senegal and Dahomey towards the poor periphery consist-
ng of present-day countries like Niger, Chad and the Central African
epublic [63].
Environmental constraints to state formation also show up in
he history of African warfare [64]. Since the use of horses was
ssential to military operations in the open savannah lands, but
seless in the tsetse-infested forest zone, it proved difﬁcult to
ntegrate both areas into an overarching state structure. The large
slamic states that emerged in the West African Sudan, such as the
edieval and early-modern empires of Mali and Songhai, were
ept together by armies of horseback warriors that were able
o cover large distances. The political challenge of these empires
as to keep the military elite, who had made signiﬁcant invest-
ents in their equipment, united and prevent disintegration by
stablishing a monopoly on the Trans-Saharan trade in horses
31,64]. In the forest zone the reach of foot soldier armies was
onsiderably smaller. The slave states that arose along the West
frican coast, such as Dahomey, Asante and Oyo, were more com-
act and often incorporated women and children in their armies
or logistic purposes [64]. Moreover, to avoid being raided by
eighbouring peoples, it was crucial for these states to maintain
heir advantage in the African-European trade of slaves for guns
65,66].f Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 17–24 21
This is not to suggest that the process of African state forma-
tion was  caged in an iron law of population scarcity and population
mobility. The Sokoto caliphate in Northern Nigeria actively pro-
moted the construction of ribats, small fortiﬁed towns that provided
a basic level of security, schooling and market exchange. In order
to settle the pastoral Fulani people and underpin the ﬁscal basis of
the state, a network of agricultural plantations was  established. The
Sokoto caliphate was  eventually swallowed up by colonial Nigeria,
but it had amassed sufﬁcient power to inspire Frederick Lugard in
formulating his famous principle of indirect rule [67]. The most
obvious aberration of the aforementioned pattern, however, was
Ethiopia. This country was  ruled by the Solomonic dynasty for
seven centuries in a row, until the military coup of 1974 deposed
its last emperor, Haile Selassie. Interestingly, the ox-drawn plough
had been used in this region for millennia and the Abyssinians had
also developed their own scripture for recording state affairs [68].
And yes, European powers tried, but never succeeded, to colonize
Ethiopia.
The bottom-line, however, is that a process of strenuous inter-
state competition, which had spurred the build-up of ﬁscal and
military capacity in early modern Europe [69], remained largely
absent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nor did there emerge an African ver-
sion of the Chinese state. The physical support structures of African
states were too porous. The recent war  in Mali has demonstrated
that even for modern African states it can be very difﬁcult to con-
trol vast empty hinterlands. After all, where did these insurgents
come from and where did they go? Furthermore, the lack of well-
deﬁned rules of land tenure resulted in increasing conﬂicts with
the rapid closing of the land frontier in the 20th century. Multiple
overlapping claims to land complicated the investments needed
to intensify production [70,71]. Hence, at the time the green rev-
olution conquered Asia, African states faced problems of a more
fundamental nature, problems that were difﬁcult to resolve quickly,
and especially so without stable institutions of conﬂict resolution
at the central political level.
6. Relative prices
That early independent African states were weak, does not
mean that its leaders neglected food crop agriculture. Food
self-sufﬁciency aligned very well with anti-colonial ideologies
emphasising Africa’s newly won political and economic indepen-
dence. In Tanzania a comprehensive program of rural development
was implemented, which ran aground due to an overdose of ill-
directed state intervention, not because of neglect. In Zimbabwe,
Kenya and Nigeria, groups of well-connected large farmers were
able to articulate their demands to the central government and suc-
cessfully adopted high-yielding varieties of maize. In many other
countries productivity gains were also recorded in the smallholder
sector during the 1960s and 1970s, but most of these were not
sustained.
Let me  discuss one more factor that highlights the added value of
a global historical perspective: the green revolution itself. Similar to
how former European and present-day Asian textile manufactures
have hampered the development of local textile industries in Africa,
the increasing supply of food grains, and especially rice, ﬂooding
the world market in the wake of the green revolution supressed
the proﬁt-margins of African farmers. The price declines caused by
the green revolution were taking effect within a long-term trend
of falling food prices since the mid-19th century (see Fig. 5). In the
second half of the 20th century world trade in agricultural products
grew at an annual rate of 3.2 percent [72], while real food prices
dropped by 10 to 15 percent between the 1967 and 1992 [73,74].
This effect was  further compounded by the structural overvaluation
of African currencies [75]. Importing food became cheaper than it
22 E. Frankema / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 17–24
Fig. 5. Historical price index of wheat in the US and UK (1901-05 = 100) Source:
Data from Koning and van Ittersum [76].
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experienced the setbacks. But not today. Average levels of govern-Fig. 6. FAO Food Price Index, 1990-2013 Source: FAOSTAT [14].8.
ad ever been. Of course, cheap food imports were beneﬁcial for the
apidly increasing number of urban poor. But they also relieved the
ressure on African governments to endure their agrarian develop-
ent programs under difﬁcult circumstances. The food price hikes
f recent years (see Fig. 6), which led to food riots in for instance
ozambique, not to mention the Arab world, are a wake-up call
hat the era of cheap food may  have come to an end. Despite the
egative consequences in the short run, a higher equilibrium price
or food may  turn out to be a blessing in disguise for African food
roducers in the long run.
. Conclusion: will this time be different?
There are increasing signs of an acceleration in the diffusion of
odern agricultural technology and structural improvements in
rop yields in Africa [1]. For example, rice yields in Benin started to
row in the early 1990s and quickened the pace after 2007, reaching
 level that exceeds 4 tonnes per hectare at present. In Rwanda
here has been a break in the long-run pattern from the turn of the
entury onwards, with yields exceeding 5 tonnes per hectare today
see Fig. 7). Similar upshots have been recorded in cassava yields
n Malawi, following the introduction of a new variety around the
urn of the century [77]. Moreover, at the micro-level there are
any more examples of rapid change [18,19,21], which may  soon
how up in the aggregate statistics as well. But we have seen phases
f agricultural growth before, especially in the 1920s and 1950s to
970s, and most of these were not sustained. What reasons do we
ave to believe that this time is different?
8 The FAO has constructed the real food price index by deﬂating its basket
f nominal food prices by the World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index. See:
ww.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/.Fig. 7. Rice yields (paddy) in Benin and Rwanda, tonnes per hectare, 1961-2011
Source: FAOSTAT [14].
First, Africa is currently experiencing nothing short of a
transportation and communication revolution. As I have argued,
throughout African history physical distances have hampered the
commercialization of agriculture and the formation of central
states. Colonial investments in railways and harbours connected
local economic enclaves to European markets, but today’s invest-
ments in road infrastructure, transport equipment, electricity and
ICT infrastructure allow for a much more ﬁne-grained process of
domestic market integration. To illustrate this, in 1990, only 1 per-
cent of Africans had a subscription to a mobile or ﬁxed telephone
connection. Today nearly every African adult has one [78]. New
communication technologies offer real time market information to
farmers at very low costs. They enable instant ﬁnancial transac-
tions and facilitate new forms of credit, saving and insurance. The
tyranny of distance in Africa dissolves as we speak.
Second, current rates of population growth and urbanization are
widely regarded as one of Africa’s biggest problems today. Some
ﬁfty years ago similar concerns were raised about Asian popula-
tion growth. However, if we take serious the argument that low
population densities and high population mobility have impaired
the development of sedentary agriculture and the growth of urban
centres, Africa’s current demographic transition is bound to change
the parameters of agrarian production. Growing urban demand in
combination with higher food prices, makes investing in local food
production systems much more attractive than it was  even a decade
ago.7 The problem with African demography is not the growth of
the population itself, nor its growing concentration. It’s the speed
of it that puts pressure on the adaptive capacity of African societies.
Third, the current macro-economic outlook is far better than
in the last quarter of the 20th century. There is controlled inﬂa-
tion and exchange rates are more in balance with the economy.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned diversity, the majority of
African economies grows at rates of 3 to 6 percent per year despite
the severe ﬁnancial and economic crisis in the industrialized world
[79]. This is an important observation. In previous periods of global
economic crisis, for instance during the Great Depression of the
1930s or the oil crises of the 1970s, African economies immediatelyment debt in Africa hover around 40% of GDP, half the rate of Dutch
government debt, not to mention Southern European levels [79].
7 I have deliberately refrained from the discussion whether such investments
should be channelled to smallholders or large-scale farmers. I believe this issue
depends very much on local conditions and history suggests that bi-modal produc-
tion systems can be fruitful as long as institutions do not systematically favour one
over  the other.
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Fourth and ﬁnally, I would argue that the rapid transitions in
frican settlement patterns and the open access to worldwide
edia and useful knowledge is bound to change the rules of the
olitical game. Of course, the formation of social identities, personal
oyalties and political machinations has always been in ﬂux, but the
urrent rise of African urban culture goes against a long historical
endency of ethnic and social fractionalization. Moreover, with the
ressure building up, African politicians face increasing incentives
o concern themselves with the lot of the urban ánd the rural poor,
hether they are democratically elected or not.
Having said this, it would be good to remark that there will be
o repetition of the Asian green revolution in Africa. The variety in
frica’s ecological conditions and historical development trajecto-
ies is too large. One can be more optimistic perhaps about West
frican coastal countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Benin, with a
omparatively strong historical record of commercialization. One
ay  be less optimistic about landlocked countries in the interior
uch as Niger, Chad, or the Central African Republic. In addition, the
ore compact African countries with a historical legacy of agrar-
an intensiﬁcation, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are in a
ore favourable position than giant colonial constructs such as the
emocratic Republic of Congo. If anything, the effects of climate
hange are likely to deepen intra-African disparities and enhance
ntra-African migration. For these reasons it is not inconceivable
hat the Great Divergence that has evolved at the global scale in the
ast ﬁve centuries, will be repeated within Sub-Saharan Africa in
he 21st century.
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